THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES
FRED E. INBAU*

Sherlock Holmes with his lens and his theories probably has afforded considerably
more entertainment to readers of his unique experiences than he has created serious
thinking on their part as to the practicability of actually applying such methods and
techniques in detecting crime, and in utilizing in criminal trials the evidence resulting therefrom. Other detectives of the fiction world, with the possible exception of
Doctor Thorndyke, have done still less to arouse more genuine interest in scientific
methods of crime detection. We have been content, it seems, to keep such figures
within the veil of our imagination and to reconcile ourselves to ordinary police
methods when attempting to solve a crime involving unconventional tactics or
motives, to say nothing of the more usual type, in which the scientific approach is
equally desirable. Only quite recently has there been any indication of a change in
attitude, and this has resulted from the unrelenting pioneering efforts of relatively
few individuals qualified to render scientific assistance to law enforcement agencies.
The general notion has become a little more widespread, but considered in terms of
what might be accomplished the era of scientific evidence has only begun.
During this somewhat transitory period the judiciary, along with the police of
this country, is receiving considerable criticism from some quarters for not utilizing
to any greater extent the assistance which scientists are prepared to offer in this field.
In partial defense for this position a police officer is often prepared to say: "What
good are your scientific methods if the facts we obtain by using them are inadmissible
as evidence?" He is, as a general rule, entirely unfamiliar with the legal status of
testimony or facts of a scientific nature, and his conclusion of inadmissibility is very
often erroneous-and even in instances where he is correct he frequently fails to
appreciate the advantage of the scientific approach for investigative purposes alone.
The layman is still more apt to find the courts responsible for not offering more
encouragemnent to the scientist and to the police in this respect. Lawyers themselves
often display guilty complexes when such discussions arise, but they too seem oblivious
to the fact that in many of the recorded opinions of the appellate courts of this
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country may be found some of the most interesting detective stories ever written,
principally because of the reality of the situation.
Consider, for instance, the case of Magnuson v. State," decided in 1925 by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The facts, as stated by that court, may appear to
have been taken from a pulp paper magazine rather than from a judicial opinion.
But there was no fiction involved. The almost unbelievable mass of scientific
evidence presented to the jury was sufficiently convincing to sustain a conviction of
murder in the first degree.
A bomb had been sent through the mails, and upon reaching the addressee, who
opened the package, there followed an explosion which caused the death of one
person and serious injury to another. The only clues with which the police had to
work were the remains of the home-made bomb and fragments of the paper-wrapper
containing the address.
An examiner of questioned documents who had been consulted suggested that
the spelling of the town address (Marsfilld for Marshfield) was characteristic of a
person familiar with the Swedish language. The only person known to have any
enmity toward the recipient of the package happened to be the only Swede in the
vicinity-the defendant, John Magnuson.
From the pieces picked up about the home of the deceased, the bomb was reconstructed, and was found to have been made of a hollow piece of white elm, a piece
of gas pipe, a brass tube, and a small piece of steel used as a trigger. The suspect's
premises were inspected. Pieces of gas pipe, of brass tubing, and other materials
were seized, including a bottle of ink, and sawdust and shavings from the work
bench. A triangular trip or trigger was taken off the suspect's gasoline engine,
because of its resemblance to the trigger found in the bomb.
With these materials in hand, counsel for the state set to work to establish the
fact that the bomb was manufactured and sent by the defendant. Samples of the
defendant's handwriting were introduced in evidence, together with testimony of
three of the country's foremost document examiners to the effect that the handwriting found upon the paper wrapper was that of the defendant. Further testimony
was admitted which established the fact that a fountain pen with a round point had
been used, similar to that found in the defendant's home, and that the ink used to
address the package gave the same chemical reaction as that found in the fountain
pen. Also, an analysis of the glue used to fasten down the string disclosed the fact
that it was the same kind as that found in the defendant's possession. A botanist
from the U. S. Forest Service Laboratory testified that the sawdust taken from the
defendant's workbench was of white elm-a significant fact because the defendant
denied that he had ever worked with elm in his shop. Expert testimony further
disclosed the fact that the trigger on the bomb came from the same piece of steel as
the trigger taken from the defendant's gas engine. This conclusion was based upon
1187 Wis. 122, 2o.3 N. W. 749 (1925).-
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the similarity in the crystalline structure and formation of the two pieces of metal,
as revealed in photomicrographs.
. All this evidence was admitted by the trial court, and received the approval of
the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin:
"We have set out the evidence with greater particularity than would ordinarily be
warranted under such circumstances, because it discloses what may be done by a diligent
prosecuting officer who has an intelligent comprehension of the things that are necessary
to establish guilt in a case of this importafice. The guilt of the defendant is as conclusively
established as it is possible for it to be. It is' scarcely conceivable that any jury could find
'2
otherwise than did the jury in this case."
Is there anything discouraging in the language of this court?
Another very interesting case is State v. Clark,3 decided in i93o by the Supreme
Court of Washington. A young girl was brutally assaulted as she passed through
a wooded field on her way home from school. Her assailant had constructed a blind
near the path-way, and for this purpose he used twigs and tree branches, which he
had cut with a knife. The police apprehended a suspect, but the girl was unable to
identify him with any degree of certainty. Nevertheless, science came into play,
and secured a conviction where conventional methods of proof would have failed.
At the trial of the culprit, an expert testified and was able to prove, with the aid
of photomicrographs, that the knife found in the possession of the accused person
was the knife that cut the twigs and tree branches of the blind in which the girl
had been assaulted.
The conviction was affirmed, and in its opinion the court had this to say for
science in its application to matters pertaining to criminal justice:
"Courts are no longer skeptical that, by the aid of scientific appliances, the identity of
a person may be established by fingerprints. There is no difference in principle in the
utilization of the photomicrograph to determine that the same tool that made one impression is the same instrument that made another impression. The edge of one blade
differs as greatly from the edge of another blade as the lines of one human hand differ
from the lines of another. This is a progressive age. The scientific means afforded should
be used to apprehend the criminal." 4
The last two remarks should offer encouragement to the men who are devoting
their lives to studies of this nature. The entire opinion repiesents an invitation to
them to utilize their most acute methods not only for the purpose of apprehension but
also for the purpose of conviction in a court of justice.
In 1929 the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals rendered a decision in a
case involving a most interesting set of facts-State v. BoceadoraY The defendant
was suspected of having shot and killed the occupant of a home while in the act of
committing burglary. In an effort to determine the defendant's whereabouts at the
time of the murder his common law wife was questioned as to her knowledge of
'Id.at

131, 203 N. W. at 753.
'Id. at 549, 287 Pac. at 20.

1,56 Wash. 543, 287 Pac. z8 (93o).
io5 N. J. L. 352, 144 Ad. 612 (1929).
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the affair. She finally informed the investigators that on the particular night in
question the defendant told her that he had fled from the scene of a burglary and
had disposed of his pistol by throwing it away as he ran from the scene of the crime.
The weapon was never located.
About a month prior to the murder, another home in the community had been
burglarized, and among the articles stolen were some jewelry and a hammerless
revolver. For some reason the owner became involved in the present investigation
and he identified as his stolen property some jewelry in possession of the defendant's
wife. The evidence indicated that this had been given her by the defendant. It was
inferred, therefore, that if the defendant had stolen the jewelry he also was guilty
of the theft of the revolver. Consequently, if there were any means of connecting
that particular weapon with the murder in question, this would constitute a material
factor in establishing his guilt.
It so happened-and herein is the strange feature of the case-that the owner of
the stolen weapon had fired a bullet from it into the ground near his home, as part
of a holiday celebration some year or two previous to the theft. It was suggested
that this be retrieved for the purpose of comparison with the fatal missile, since there
was no evidence weapon from which a test bullet could be obtained. Fortunately
it was found. An examination was made by an expert with the aid of a comparison
microscope, and he was permitted to testify at the defendant's trial that this old
bullet and the fatal bullet were fired from the same pistol. This evidence the
appellate court considered sufficiently reliable to sustain a conviction of first degree
murder.
Is there anything discouraging about this case? Certainly it cannot be said that
the court considered itself bound by precedent established in dusty old law books,
because there was no such precedent for so unusual a case, although the science of
firearms identification itself had already received judicial sanction.
Many other equally interesting cases might be mentioned, such as People v.
Wallage8 and State v. Johnson,7 to say nothing of the famous Hauptmann case, and
others of which we have no judicial record because appeals were not taken to superior
courts.
In the Wallage case, principally because of the following facts, an automobile was
identified as being the one involved in a hit-and-run accident: similarity in chemical
composition between a sample of paint taken from the dented portion of an automobile fender and a specimen of paint present on the shirt worn by the deceased at
the time of the accident; the presence, as revealed by a microscopic examination, of
minute lines or scratches on the automobile fender where the paint had been rubbed
off, which corresponded in number-thirty-one to the inch-with the raised threads
in the cloth of the shirt; and the further fact, as stated in the opinion of the expert
witness, that from a microscopic examination of other scratches and an examination
6353 Ili. 95, 186 N. E. 540 (1933).

"t37N. M. 280, 21 Pac. (2d) 813 (1933).
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of the right suspender buckle in the back of the overalls worn by the deceased child,
he found that the scratches on the fender were of the "same contour, design and size"

as the buckle of the overalls worn by the deceased.
In the Johnson case, finger nail scrapings taken from a young girl, the victim of
a criminal assault, and of a suspect, furnished a very convincing bit of evidence
indicating the suspect's guilt. An expert found in the debris taken from underneath
the deceased's nails several plant fibers colored blue, which he described as identical
in appearance with cotton fibers scraped by him from the blue and white overalls
worn by the defendant on the night in question. Chemical tests disclosed that the
debris removed from underneath the fingernails of both the deceased and the defendant contained, in addition to skin particles, "a number of small bright carmine
red particles, highly transparent,

. .

.and identical in color, appearance, and refrac-

tion," from which facts it was inferred that the "Kiss-Proof" lipstick worn by the
deceased constituted the common origin of both specimens of evidence.
The road to judicial recognition of scientific evidence is not always an easy one,
as indicated by the historical development of firearms identification testimony in
the state of Illinois. In examples like this the layman finds some support for his
criticism of the courts concerning such matters.
In i923, in People v. Berkman,' the Supreme Court of Illinois failed to appreciate
the significance or the possibilities of this new phase of circumstantial evidence. It
even went so far as to label as "preposterous" the suggestion that distinctive markings
were impressed upon bullets fired from different pistols of the same caliber and
make. In 193o the same court had before it another case involving the admissibility
of firearms identification testimony-People v. Fiorita,9 in which the decision represents what might be termed the second stage in the progressive evolution toward
judicial acceptance in Illinois. The appellate court recognized the accuracy of the
science itself but reversed the case because of the incompetency of the expert witness.
Instead of branding firearms identification as "preposterous," however, the court
stated that while the science was well recognized "both in this country and abroad,
testimony based upon it should be admitted with the greatest care. No witness
should be permitted to testify regarding the identification of firearms and bullets by
the use of this science unless the witness has clearly shown that he is qualified to give
such testimony." Notice the change of attitude during that brief seven year period
since the decision of the previous case! And then consider the third stage-the
decision in the landmark case of People v.Fisher,'0 decided four months later. In
this case firearms identification finally received the stamp of approval by the Illinois
Supreme Court. The trial court had heard the testimony of a competent witness so
the appellate court, pursuant to the policy laid down in the .Fiorita case, completely
recognized as trustworthy the same science it had labeled as "preposterous" only five
years previously.
8307 Ill. 492, 139 N. E. 91 (1923).
D339 Ill.
78, 17o N. E. 69o (1930).
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This display of caution by the Illinois courts the layman does not seem to understand. In 1923, when the first Illinois case came up for consideration, the science of
firearms identification was yet in its infancy. For that reason we should not be
surprised to find a court unwilling to accept it as evidence, although the use of the
word "preposterous" formed an unnecessary part of the court's opinion. Nevertheless, today there is no longer any question regarding the admissibility of firearms
identification evidence, not only in the State of Illinois, but in all other jurisdictions
as well. The appellate courts of thirteen states, and one federal circuit court of
appeals, have definitely signified their approval of its use in criminal cases, and even
though the problem has not presented itself for the consideration of the appellate
courts in other jurisdictions, there appears to be no reason to expect a contrary
ruling."'
Another type of scientific evidence which was utilized by the police long before
it received judicial sanction is that of finger-prints. Although for years the science
of fingerprint identification played an important part in police investigations, it was
not until 1911 that an appellate court in the United States passed upon its admissibility as a link in the chain of circumstances indicating the guilt of an accused indi12
vidual. In that year, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in People v.lennings, took
judicial notice of the fact that the finger-prints of any individual are so distinctive
as to permit their use for the purpose of identification, and admitted expert testimony
as to the similarity between the evidence print and that of the defendant-under the
general common law rule that whatever tends to prove a material fact is relevant and
competent.
Since the Jennings decision a number of others have been rendered by various
state appellate courts upon the subject, among them being the highest tribunals of
New Jersey, New York, Arizona, Oklahoma, and North Carolina. In every instance
such evidence has been held admissible. Moreover, palm-print evidence occupies
the same judicial status, according to the decisions in several cases rendered by the
appellate courts of Arizona, Vermont, and Michigan. The courts have even gone
to the extent of admitting finger-print evidence in instances where an accused's
prints (those used for comparison) have been taken under compulsion.' 3
The one type of scientific evidence with which the courts have done some obviously unnecessary wrangling is that of handwriting identification, one of the principal problems arising in the broader field of expert examination of questioned
documents. For historical reasons the courts were very insistent, until recent years,
that the only documents which could be used for comparison were those "in the
'See lnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: 1. Firearms ldentification-"Ballstis" (1933) 24
J. CRIm. L. & CRIMIN. 825, 842. This article also contaips a discussion of some of the related problems in
firearms identification such as the determination, from a study of powder burns and shot dispersion, of
the distance at which a gun had been fired.
2252 Ill.
534, 96 N. E. 1077 (19x).
"See Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: IlL. Finger-prints and Palm-prints (1934) 25 J.
GRim. L. & CRIMNU.500-517.
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case for other purposes." This restriction seriously hampered the expert witness,
and, as Mr. Albert S. Osborn has remarked, "the whole history of the subject has
been clouded by this unfortunate procedure."'14 But today, either by statute or by
decision, the expert may avail himself of standards for comparison even though they
are to be introduced in evidence for that purpose alone. 5
As to the intrinsic merits of expert examination of handwriting and other documentary evidence, the courts were not so slow in their appreciation. Therefore,
with the removal of the restriction upon the use of unrelated standards and a recognition of the advisability and necessity for the use of expert testimony in this field,
today an attorney handling a case involving disputed. documents may, without much
difficulty, present an expert witness in court to prove (with certain limitations in
particular instances) any or all of the follow:-ig: identity of an anonymous writing;
genuineness or spuriousness of a signature; that a certain person did or did not
execute a questioned signature or a forgery; the presence of erasures, alterations,
substitutions'and additions; sequence of writing; the identity of typewritten material;

and the identification of materials of writing, such as ink, paper (more generally
as to type only), etc. 6
Another type of evidence of a scientific nature which seems destined to eventually
play an important role in our judicial system, but which is barred at the present
time, is that regarding the detection of deception. Several attempts have been made
to introduce evidence obtained by the use of so-called "lie-detectors," but in each
instance admissibility has been denied. However, even in these adverse decisions
the courts have sounded a note of encouragement.
Especially noteworthy in this connection is the language of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in its decision of Frye v. United States,1 7 which involved the
admissibility of a psychologist's testimony regarding a deception test made upon the
defendant by the use of a "systolic blood pressure" method. Since very little was
knowfn at that time, 1923, about scientific methods of detecting deception, the court
may have been inclined to label as "preposterous" the notion that there exists a
correlation between blood pressure changes and deception. However, it chose to use
the following language:
"Just when a scientific principle of discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this. twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
"We think that the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would
" See OSBORN, QUESTIONED

DOCUMENTS

(2d ed. 1929) 26.

"Hall v. State, 171 Ark. 787, 286 S. W. xo26 (1926).
" See numerous cases cited in concluding chapters of OSBORN, op. cit. supra note 14.
754 App. D. C. 46, 293 Fed. 1013 (1923), Note (1925) 34 A. L. R. 145.
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justify the courts in admitting evidence deduced from the discovery, development, and
18
experiments thus far made."
Since 1923 considerable progress has been made in this field of detecting deception, but still not enough to justify its court application, according to a X933 decision
1
of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in State v. Bohner.'
In this case defense
counsel offered to prove by means of a "lie-detector" the truthfulness of the defendant's alibi, which offer the trial court refused. Upon appeal the Supreme Court
conceded that the instrument (one recording pulse wave, blood pressure changes and
respiratory changes) "may have some utility at present, and may ultimately be of
great value in the administration of justice." Nevertheless, the court was of the
opinion that a "too hasty acceptance of it during this stage of its development may
bring complications and abuses which will overbalance whatever utility it may be
assumed to have." 20
The possible "complications and abuses" constitute a constant source of concern
on tho part of those persons actively engaged in this field. They realize, from the
data and information already at hand, 21 that the results of a detection of deception
test with a suitable instrument recording pulse wave, blood pressure and respiratory
changes, and perhaps other physiological reactions, when conducted and interpreted
by a competent and honest individual are worthy of consideration as evidence for or
against the defendant in a criminal trial, but they also realize, and only too well,
that once given unlimited judicial approval the entire field immediately lends itself
to prostitution by unethical and incompetent examiners. The fact that the method
is nothing more nor less than a diagnostic technique,2 2 the value of which depends
to a very considerable extent upon the competency of the examiner, and certainly to
the same degree upon his integrity, entirely justifies the conservative position taken
by the courts in the Frye and Bohner cases. In this field, more than in any of the
others previously discussed, the remuneration for quackery is unlimited. With this
consideration in view, the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of Northwestern
University School of Law, which for the past five years has been the center of
research and actual case work in this field, proposes only a conditional and restricted
use of an instrument of this nature for court purposes-at least for the time being,
and perhaps for quite some time to come. The prerequisite to the admissibility of
such evidence should be a stipulation or agreement between counsel for prosecution
and defense, made prior to the expert's examination, that the results and the expert's
'Id. at 47, 293 Fed. at 1014.
"2io Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933).
'In this opinion there is a quotation from defense counsel to the effect that the defendant offered to
prove "by Prof. Leonarde Keeler of Northwestern University . . . that the defendant . . . was not

guilty." The language may convey the impression that Mr. Keeler actually conducted the tests,
and participated in the case. As a matter of fact, however, he did not test the defendant. The extent
of his participation consists of correspondence with defense counsel, in which Mr. Keeler consented merely
to examine the defendant and to render a report to defendant's counsel.
'See Inbau, The "Lie-Detector" (935) 40 THE SCaN'nFic MONTHLY 81-87.
"See Keeler, Debunking the "Lie-Detector" (1934) 25 J. CRIm. L. & CmmN. 153-i60.
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interpretation thereof are to be admitted without objection and regardless of whether
they favor the cause of prosecution or defense. This, of course, presupposes an agreement between counsel upon the expert himself. In this way the probability of
incompetent and unethical practices would be reduced to a minimum.
3
In a recent Wisconsin case, State v. Loniello and Grignano,2
the Circuit Court
of Columbia County approved of such a stipulation and agreement as that outlined
above and admitted so-called "lie-detector" records and also expert testimony con-

cerning their interpretation. Along with this, of course, other evidence of the usual
type was introduced.
defendant.

A conviction resulted but no appeal was taken by either

This analysis of court decisions might be extended to cover a much wider variety
and number of cases involving scientific evidence, but those discussed thus far should
serve to indicate that the courts of this country are ready and willing to adopt, though
with caution, the otherwise recognised evidence which may result from the application of scientific methods to criminal investigations.
' February 7, 1935, Judge Clayton F. Van Pelt presiding. See Inbau, Detection of Deception Technique Admitted as Evidence (1935) 26 J. Clam. L. & CvuMiu. 262-271.

